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Central counterparty clearing: 
constructing a framework for evaluation of risks and 
benefits 
Bank of Finland Discussion Papers 30/2004 
Kirsi Ripatti 




A Central Counterparty (CCP) is an entity that interposes itself between 
transacting counterparties – a seller vis-à-vis the original buyer and a buyer vis-à-
vis the original seller – to guarantee execution of the transaction. Thus, the 
original transacting parties substitute their contractual relationships with each 
other with contracts with the CCP. 
  Central Counterparty Clearing has become increasingly popular in Europe, 
not just in derivatives markets, where, due to the high risk involved, it has been 
common for decades, but also in equities markets. Within the European Union, 
the main factor motivating the increased sophistication in clearing arrangements is 
the ongoing process of European economic integration, ie the euro’s introduction, 
the ongoing organisation of an internal market for financial services and the 
corresponding objective of creating a pan-European financial infrastructure for 
payments and securities clearing and settlement. 
  Central counterparty clearing houses exert a broad influence on the 
functioning of financial markets. They can increase the efficiency and stability of 
financial markets to the extent that their smooth functioning results in a more 
efficient use of collateral, lower operating costs and greater liquidity. As market 
players actively try to achieve economies of scale and scope with mergers and 
through harmonising their technical processes, they inevitably have had to focus 
on one of the most fragmented areas in Europe’s securities market infrastructure – 
clearing and settlement. Because of the importance of its role, a CCP must have 
sound risk management. The CCP assumes responsibility in the aggregate and 
reallocates risk among participants. Moreover, if the CCP fails to perform risk 
management well, it can increase risk in the markets. 
  While the big market players dominate the current CCP market in Europe, it 
is not only the big players who can benefit from a functioning CCP. With the right 
structure, a CCP enables small players to stay in the market and makes it possible 
for issuers in a regional marketplace to achieve market funding. Indeed, this is the  
4 
tendency currently seen in the newest EU member states – and one of the main 
arguments against the single European CCP model. 
  Although, the purpose has been to leave CCP questions to market participants, 
regulatory, oversight and supervisory issues can drive the actions of market 
participants. Indeed, authorities must sometimes be actively involved in boosting 
a CCP project to keep their home markets competitive. This may well be the 
situation faced by the Nordic/Baltic market in the near future. 
  Thus, this paper attempts to give a neutral evaluation of the risks and benefits 
related to the functionality of CCPs in integrating markets and construct a 
framework for possible future risk-benefit analysis in a Finnish/Nordic-Baltic 
clearing and settlement infrastructure that incorporates a CCP solution. This is an 
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Keskusvastapuoliselvitys: 
kehikko riskien ja hyötyjen arvioimiseksi 






Keskusvastapuoli (Central Counterparty, CCP) on yhteisö, joka asettuu kaupan 
osapuolten väliin – myyjäksi alkuperäiselle ostajalle ja ostajaksi alkuperäiselle 
myyjälle – ja takaa kaupan toteutumisen. Tällöin kaupan alkuperäiset osapuolet 
korvaavat keskinäiset sopimussuhteensa keskusvastapuolen  kanssa tekemillään 
sopimuksilla. 
 Keskusvastapuoliselvitys  on  yleistynyt Euroopassa paitsi johdannaismarkki-
noilla myös käteismarkkinoilla. Johdannaismarkkinoilla sitä on käytetty jo vuosi-
kymmeniä johdannaiskauppoihin liittyvien suurten riskien vuoksi. Euroopan 
unionissa tarpeen arvopaperikaupan selvityksen kehittämiselle ovat luoneet ensi-
sijaisesti Euroopan taloudellisen integraation edistyminen eli euron käyttöönotto 
ja meneillään oleva rahoituspalvelujen sisämarkkinoiden kehittäminen sekä siihen 
liittyvä tavoite luoda Euroopan laajuinen rahoitusmarkkinoiden infrastruktuuri 
maksujen ja arvopaperikauppojen selvitykselle ja toimitukselle. 
  Pyrkiessään aktiivisesti saavuttamaan skaala- ja yhteistuotannon etuja 
fuusioilla ja sovittamalla yhteen teknisiä prosesseja markkinaosapuolet ovat 
väistämättä joutuneet keskittymään yhteen Euroopan arvopaperimarkkinoiden 
pirstoutuneimmista alueista – selvitykseen ja toimitukseen. Keskusvastapuoli-
selvitysyhteisöjen merkitys rahoitusmarkkinoiden toiminnassa on huomattava. 
Nämä yhteisöt voivat lisätä rahoitusmarkkinoiden tehokkuutta ja vakautta siinä 
määrin, että niiden häiriötön toiminta johtaa aiempaa tehokkaampaan vakuuksien 
käyttöön, vähäisempiin käyttökustannuksiin ja suurempaan likviditeettiin. Kes-
keisen asemansa vuoksi keskusvastapuolilla on oltava luotettavat riskienhallinta-
menetelmät. Keskusvastapuoli kantaa kokonaisvastuun kaupasta ja allokoi osa-
puolten riskit uudelleen. Mikäli keskusvastapuoli epäonnistuu riskienhallinnassa, 
se voi myös lisätä markkinoiden riskiä. 
  Vaikka nykyisiä keskusvastapuolipalvelujen markkinoita Euroopassa hallit-
sevat suuret markkinaosapuolet, toimivat keskusvastapuolijärjestelmät eivät ole 
vain niiden etu. Rakenteeltaan oikeanlainen keskusvastapuolijärjestelmä mahdol-
listaa sen, että myös pienet osapuolet voivat toimia markkinoilla ja että alueellis- 
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ten markkinoiden liikkeeseenlaskijat saavat markkinarahoitusta. Tämä kehitys-
suunta on tällä hetkellä nähtävissä EU:n uusimmissa jäsenvaltioissa – se on myös 
tärkeimpiä perusteluja yhteistä, vain yhdestä eurooppalaisesta keskusvasta-
puolesta muodostuvaa mallia vastaan. 
 Vaikka  keskusvastapuolikysymykset on ollut tarkoitus jättää markkinaosa-
puolten ratkaistaviksi, sääntelyyn, yleisvalvontaan ja valvontaan liittyvät näkö-
kohdat voivat vaikuttaa markkinaosapuolten toimintaan. Viranomaisten on toi-
sinaan osallistuttava aktiivisesti keskusvastapuolihankkeen edistämiseen omien 
kotimarkkinoiden kilpailukyvyn säilyttämiseksi. Tämä saattaa hyvinkin olla ajan-
kohtaista Pohjoismaiden ja Baltian markkinoilla lähitulevaisuudessa. 
  Tässä keskustelualoitteessa pyritään neutraalisti arvioimaan keskusvastapuoli-
selvityksen toimivuuteen liittyviä riskejä ja etuja integroituvilla markkinoilla. 
Lisäksi siinä pyritään luomaan kehikko mahdolliselle tulevaisuudessa tehtävälle 
riski-hyötyanalyysille, joka koskee keskusvastapuolijärjestelyt sisältävää suoma-
laista/pohjoismais-balttilaista selvitys- ja toimitusinfrastruktuuria. Tämä kes-
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The process of clearing and settling a securities trade has two key steps. After a 
trade is made, the obligations of the counterparties resulting from the trade are 
calculated. This is known as clearing. The process ends with the settlement of the 
obligations and involves the final transfer of the securities (delivery) in exchange 
for the final transfer of funds (payment). The clearing house acts as a central 
counterparty (CCP) when it interposes itself as a legal counterparty to both sides 
of a transaction, ie acts as a buyer to every seller and a seller to every buyer for a 
specified set of contracts such as those executed on a particular exchange or 
trading system. From the perspective of market participants, the credit risk of the 
CCP is substituted for the credit risk of the other participants (Figure 1).
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Figure 1.  Interposition of a CCP 
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• CMF = Clearing Member Firm
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Source: Bank of Finland.  
 
 
Currently, central counterparty clearing can be seen as an integral part of the 
modern post-trading processes. Central counterparties are increasingly favoured 
by market participants as their utility extends beyond derivatives markets to a 
wider range of financial instruments. 
  CCPs were established to protect market participants from counterparty risk 
in exchange-traded derivatives markets. Derivative contracts traded on an 
                                                 
3 For more about the clearing and settlement process, see eg Bank of Finland (2002).  
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exchange were executed with a single counterparty, the clearing house, which 
processed all transactions and guaranteed performance.
4 The organisation of 
central counterparty services for derivatives markets has been greatly influenced 
by the current organisation of the exchange markets and by the composition and 
identify of the parties trading on those markets. Both the exchanges and their 
associated clearing houses reflect a long history of development. Recently, CCPs 
have begun to offer clearing services to cash and over-the-counter (OTC) markets. 
  Finland has a CCP for derivative instruments in the Helsinki Stock 
Exchanges. Finnish derivatives trading and clearing will be transferred to the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange at the end of 2004. Thereafter, the execution of 
Finnish derivatives will take place locally, ie settlements related to the execution 
of derivatives will be effected in Finland through the Finnish CSD, APK and 
custodian banks. 
  As noted, CCPs interpose themselves as principal to both sides of the 
transaction. The substituting out the original counterparties and replacing them 
with a new contractual counterparty is called a contract novation. Through 
novation, the CCP creates more certainty in trading. This is not to say that a CCP 
removes counterparty credit risk from a market, but it manages and redistributes 
that risk by establishing rules as to who bears losses arising from a participant 
default. Novation also replaces market participants’ exposure to bilateral credit 
risks with a standard credit risk to the CCP. The timing of novation has important 
implications for the distribution of counterparty risk between the CCP and its 
clearing members.
5 
  CCPs typically apply strict access criteria, accepting only the financially 
healthiest participants. Many CCPs have two-tiered membership structures, where 
only general clearing members or direct clearing members have a direct 
relationship with them. They often have a requirement of bank status.
6 The other 
participants (indirect participants) are forced to use a general clearing member, 
often a competitor, to gain access to the clearing system. 
  To protect against a clearing member default, CCPs have developed a variety 
of risk management procedures such as strict access rules, own funds and 
separation of clearing and guarantee funds. Anticipatory stress testing and 
marginal payments are also important tools of risk management. An initial margin 
is deposited at the start of the transaction by clearing members. Variation margins 
are called when positions are revalued during the course of a transaction, using a 
‘marking-to-market’ procedure. CCPs may also have access to additional default 
resources such as mutual guarantee funds or insurance cover. They can require 
                                                 
4 Central counterparties were either part of a derivatives exchange or independent entities. 
5 The moment the novation occurs depends on the CCP’s rules. 
6 General clearing members clear and settle both their own positions and positions of indirect 
participants. Direct clearing members are only allowed to clear and settle their own positions.  
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clearing members to fulfil financial requirements to reduce the likelihood of 
default. 
  We can distinguish at least three netting levels: margin, obligation and 
settlement levels (Figure 2). To protect members and the clearing house against 
client defaults, every member is typically required to set a minimum level of 
margin for their clients according to rules set down by the clearing house. Under 
net margining clearing members are permitted to net together their long and short 
positions of different clients and only post the margin on aggregate net positions. 
Under gross margining, members are required to deposit a margin with the CCP 
that is sufficient to cover the gross positions of their clients. While net margining 
systems predominate,
7 a CCP can in theory handle both net and gross deliveries to 
the securities settlement system (SSS). 
  CCPs can also provide service by netting cash or securities 
deliveries/obligations. Bilateral netting reduces the bilateral flows between each 
pair of counterparties to a single net obligation. Multilateral netting provides for 
the netting of all obligations stemming from participants in the system and 
produces a single obligation due to or owed to individual counterparties within the 
netting group. This minimises the number of obligations to be settled and 
increases efficiency. There are two types of multilateral netting: settlement netting 
and contractual netting. Settlement netting involves offsetting the mutual 
obligations of all participants, resulting in a single position for a specific security 
to be delivered or received, and a single cash payment to be made for each 
participant vis-à-vis all other participants. This service can be provided by either 
the CCP or the SSS (and unlike contractual netting, which is only provided by 
CCPs). Contractual netting is used to reduce individual contractual obligations to 
a single obligation vis-à-vis the CCP, thus reducing the impact of trading volumes 
on market participants’ balance sheets and books. 
 
                                                 
7 Bank of England (1999a), (2002).  
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From a participant’s standpoint, the CCP is justified by the higher profitability it 
potentially offers. The CCP directly reduces counterparty credit risk, as well as 
provides the above-mentioned capital adequacy impact and anonymity of trading. 
The benefits of a CCP have also become apparent in with increasing cross-border 
activity. In addition to efficient processing, anonymous trading and multilateral 
netting benefits that reduce operational and capital costs, the CCP also contributes 
to risk reduction. How well it accomplishes this, however, depends on how well it 
manages financial, legal and operational risks. Inadequately protected CCPs can 
exacerbate systemic risks, while well-run, well-protected CCPs can help contain 
systemic risks.
8 The possible threat of systemic risk, while small, is a reason 
central banks are interested in the functioning of CCPs. Of course, regulators also 
have more mundane responsibilities as well. Given their complementary interests, 
it generally advisable those authorities cooperate closely. 
  At present, there are several central counterparty clearing houses operating in 
Europe and the US. Although the current European securities clearing and 
settlement infrastructure is still highly fragmented and inefficient, there are 
several projects under consideration that would set up new CCPs in countries 
where there is currently no such market infrastructure. Economies of scale and 
                                                 
8 A risk that inability of one institution to meet its obligations when due will cause other 
institutions to be unable to meet their obligations when due. See section 2.2, Risks faced by CCPs 
and their management.  
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network externalities seem to favour a high degree of concentration. Therefore, 
several major global investment banks have expressed support for the idea that 
Europe should have a single central counterparty clearing house, providing multi-
currency and multi-product (equities, bonds, derivatives and commodities) 
service. A core argument articulated in this debate is that the creation of a single 
CCP in Europe would create clearing arrangements that mirror those in the United 
States, where clearing arrangements are already more consolidated, and therefore 
more cost effective than in Europe. There are, however, strong counter-arguments 
to this view. An ECB study (Occasional Paper No. 5/2002) shows that a critical 
comparison between the US and European cases leads to different conclusions in 
the case of derivatives. In some respects, clearing arrangements in the US are in 
fact less integrated than in Europe.
9 Market structure is one of the most dominant 
elements when comparing utilities; utilities are different in different markets. 
  The risk reduction and efficiency improvements arising from a CCP are 
expected to outweigh their costs in most markets, particularly in high-volume, 
developed markets. Over time, CCPs may come to be viewed as a core part of the 
market infrastructure in almost all markets, much as central securities depositories 
(CSD) became over the past decade. However, there is no single view, 
particularly within the euro area, about what infrastructure should prevail. The 
forthcoming chapters do not attempt to answer this question either, but rather seek 
to illuminate risks and benefits related to the functionality of CCPs. 
  Section 2 discusses market features that affect the suitability of central 
counterparty clearing and provides an assessment of advantages and 
disadvantages of CCPs. Section 3 takes the regulatory view, considering interests 
of central banks, standardisation and corporate governance issues. Section 4 
elaborates possible prospects of central counterparty clearing from the risk 
perspective and integration perspective. Section 5 concludes. 
  This paper is intended to help readers with a basic knowledge securities 
clearing and settlement systems get up to speed on CCP issues. This paper 
summarises aspects from relevant articles written about the subject, eg Bank of 
England (1999, 2002), Riksbank (2002) and ECB (2001, 2002) and tries to widen 
the scope of those by gathering elements (eg views of market participants) 
relevant for possible risk-benefit analysis of the Finnish/Nordic-Baltic clearing 
and settlement infrastructure. 
 
 
                                                 
9 ECB (2002).  
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2  What market features affect the suitability of 
central counterparty clearing? 
Clearing houses earlier operated in the shadows of derivatives exchanges, but this 
is changing as it becomes evident that the central counterparty clearing houses 
provide are an important feature of the modern financial landscape. 
  In addition to exchange-traded derivatives markets, the risks associated with 
non-performance arise in many other markets, including markets with much 
shorter settlement cycles (eg rising volumes can increase counterparty risk and 
allow in unfamiliar remote members). This can rapidly amplify disturbances. In 
equity markets, where an electronic order book is employed to match trades, 
participants may be unable – or even have no intent
10 – to manage counterparty 
risk through their choice of counterparty. As a result, central counterparty services 
have recently emerged in a variety of cash markets, providing such valuable 
benefits as cost savings, confidentiality, risk reduction and capital efficiency.
11 
  CCPs have also extended their range of services in derivatives markets, with a 
number of CCPs now clearing a range of OTC contracts. In repo markets, 
contractual netting offers the advantage of centralised risk management for all the 
multilateral positions of a specific participant. While CCPs generally provide 
these services directly to a limited range of clearing members, other market 
participants can benefit indirectly as clients of direct members.
12 The advantages 
of a central counterparty further increases when the same counterparty can be 
used for more than one market. The marginal cost of adding new instruments in 
an existing central counterparty system is also likely to be low.
13 
  Not all the markets and asset categories are necessarily suitable for central 
counterparty clearing. The potential benefits of a central counterparty may come 
at a cost and in some markets sufficient benefits may simply not be available. 
  Whether a market is suitable for central counterparty clearing can therefore be 
determined by eg exchange, multilateral trading facilities (ECN, some of ATS 
with standardised instruments), OTC trading and single dealer ATS (which may 
avoid clients from taking risk on ATS operators which could be a broker)
14 and 
the trade-off between potential costs and benefits to market participants (including 
any social costs and benefits). Counterparty credit risk should only be an 
unwanted by-product of trading activity, rather than a risk deliberately taken by 
market participants to enhance returns. This would suggest that, in general, firms 
                                                 
10 This is due to the demand of best execution. 
11 Euronext’s ‘mother’ exchange, SBF, adopted a CCP model for its trading operations (without 
rolling settlement) in 1990. It was probably the earliest adopter outside futures and options. 
12 Bank of England (2002). 
13 Riksbank (2002). 
14 Korhonen (2001).  
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want to take on market risk, ie take on exposure to the future price movements of 
a particular asset. Alternatively, the type of trading may preclude a detailed 
assessment of counterparty credit risk. If the credit quality of market participants 
is relatively uniform and counterparty exposure is an inherent, but unwanted, 
feature of trading in a particular market, sharing risk by pooling or insurance is 
more likely to be attractive because of the limited opportunity to reduce risk by 
screening of counterparties based on credit analysis.
15 A central counterparty is 
not the only way to control counterparty credit risk, traditional trading limits and 
collateralisation also offer opportunities to control counterparty credit risk. In 
addition, eg Leinonen (2003) proposes T+0 settlement to minimise counterparty 
risks. 
  Another key market feature that affects suitability for central counterparty 
clearing is the magnitude of counterparty exposure. In general, counterparty risk 
will be of greater concern to market participants where credit exposures are 
volatile or prolonged. In some markets, pre-settlement credit risks may already be 
low – perhaps when the price volatility of the instrument being traded is relatively 
low or the settlement cycle is short (as in most cash markets). In such cases, the 
additional benefits of a central counterparty may not materialise. 
  If the traded good is standardised and market participants have created 
offsetting
16 exposures, a central counterparty can make settlement by offset 
feasible as it becomes counterparty to every trade.
17 
 CPSS-IOSCO  recommendations
18 suggest that, in particular, establishing a 
robust risk management system for a CCP generally requires significant initial 
investment and ongoing expenses. Thus, individual markets should carefully 
balance the benefits and costs of a CCP. This balance will depend on factors such 
as the volume and value of transactions, trading patterns among counterparties, 
and the opportunity costs associated with settlement liquidity. A growing number 
of countries have determined that the benefits of implementing a CCP outweigh 
the costs. 
  In markets that currently operate without a CCP, market participants and 
relevant public authorities need to collaborate when assessing the benefits and 
costs of establishing and using such an organisation. Broadly speaking, they must 
choose from two alternatives: 
 
                                                 
15 Bank of England (1999a). 
16 Settlement by offset means that a firm can extinguish a position by entering into an equal and 
opposite trade with any other central counterparty participant. 
17 Bank of England (1999a). 
18 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) – International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (2001).  
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–  Build and operate a new CCP, or 
–  Use the services of an established CCP in another centre or for another trading 
market. 
 
Although most markets that currently use a CCP have opted for the first 
alternative, the latter should not be dismissed, particularly for smaller markets or 
where a CCP is already used for other products such as exchange-traded or over-
the-counter derivatives. Although added concentration of risk may result, it can be 
appropriately managed and in many cases will be outweighed by the economy-of-
scale benefits that can be gained from use of an existing CCP. The cost of 
adapting and increasing the capacity of an existing CCP is likely to be 
considerably lower than the costs of building a new CCP. In addition, the 
operating costs of the one CCP can then be spread over a greater volume of 
transactions, with a consequently lower unit cost. 
  As far as possible, a central counterparty should be structured so that 
participants retain incentives to control the risks they introduce into the system. 
The allocation of any losses should be transparent, the resources available to the 
clearing house should be proportionate to the risks to which it is exposed and 
management should be accountable to those potentially exposed to loss.
19 
  To summarise, market participants must weigh the advantages
20 of a central 
counterparty against the costs of establishing and operating a CCP. If the market 
can be integrated into an established central counterparty with a technical system 
already available, the costs may well be limited. 
 
 
2.1  Benefits of using CCPs 
The primary force behind the creation of CCPs is the economic interest of capital 
market participants in lowering the market-side risks and costs of post-trade 




–  Traders value anonymity. The facilitation of full post-trade anonymity 
through the introduction of CCP benefits both users and trading platforms. 
–  CCPs help narrow trading spreads. The reduction in market impact allows a 
trader to offer tighter spreads to buy-side institutional clients. Narrower 
spreads, in turn, attract further trading activity to the order book. 
 
                                                 
19 Bank of England (1999b). 
20 See Section 2.1, Benefits of using CCPs.  
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Risk benefits 
–  Decreased (counterparty) credit risk. Use of a CCP offers two credit exposure 
enhancements. First, it facilitates multilateral exposure netting, which 
typically reduces overall credit exposure. Second, it consolidates bilateral 
exposures into a single low risk exposure with a CCP. 
 
Balance sheet benefits 
–  Increased return on capital via cost reduction. 
–  Improved credit standing. Firms may elect to retain the released capital and 
thereby improve their credit standings (contribution to profitability). 
–  Reduced leverage ratios. Use of a CCP in the repo market has the further 




–  CCPs can reduce back-office tasks over the long run. Use of a CCP and 
accompanying risk management methods introduces significant savings at the 
operational level. 
–  Reductions in overall market costs. While the cost discussion often focuses on 
merger activity at the settlement level, most of these anticipated savings are 
achieved at the clearing level through the expansion of netting and the 
appropriate choice of settlement platform. 
–  Netting cuts settlement costs when fewer trades proceed to settlement. These 
cost reductions are valuable to private investors. 
–  Increased straight-through processing (STP). By standardising market 
processes, documentation and systems and processing trades through a single 
channel, STP can be increased greatly and costs reduced, optimising the level 
of capital required to support operational risk. 
 
There are other reasons, but those mentioned above largely explain the increased 
demand for CCP services (particularly within the euro area). First, the growing 
volumes in securities trading have increased the demand for netting. Second, the 
internationalisation of securities trading, the introduction of new electronic 
platforms and the switch to order-driven anonymous trading systems in national 
stock exchanges have made it increasingly impossible for trading parties to 
control counterparty risk themselves. There is, therefore, a rapidly growing need 
for guaranteed clearing and settlement.
21 Figure 3 offers a functional classification 
of benefits of CCP services. 
 
                                                 
21 ECB (2001).  
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• Centralized position records between ex – delivery
• Corporate Action between ex- and fulfillment of underlying
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• CCP is contractual partner of all trades regardless of origin
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  out of pending obligations
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• Reduction of settlement instructions
Source: Eurex.  
 
 
CCPs have both cost and efficiency benefits for market participants. CCPs 
generally offer straight-through processing facilities aimed at reducing back-office 
bottlenecks. However, gains from the reduction in operational costs have to be 
balanced against the fees and the implicit costs intermediaries must pay. The 
netting of exposures reduces the capital required to support participants’ trading 
activity and helps improve price liquidity on markets. The redistribution of 
counterparty credit risk creates social benefits where the risk is reallocated to a 
greater number of participants better able to bear that risk. 
  Central counterparty clearing also gives rise to benefits by providing risk 
management services to market participants. When engaging in a securities trade, 
market participants are exposed to the risk that their trading counterparties will 
not settle their obligations when due (liquidity risk) or will not settle their 
obligations at all (counterparty credit risk). To protect themselves against such 
risks, market participants can take protective measures such as exposure limits 
and collateralisation. CCPs manage risks for their members, replacing exposures 
to multiple counterparties with a single exposure to a single central counterparty. 
CCPs thus enable market participants to trade without having to worry about the 
creditworthiness of individual counterparties.  
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  This does not mean that CCPs eliminate counterparty credit risk; they rather 
manage and redistribute it far more efficiently than market participants could do 
in isolation. CCPs also do not eliminate liquidity risk; CCPs do not universally 
guarantee timely securities delivery (although they will typically guarantee timely 
delivery of money).
22 
  Central counterparty clearing helps maintain anonymity where the trade 
execution process itself is anonymous. This can be a valuable service when 
market participants fear a market impact as a result of their trading activities. 
  The other benefits CCPs can provide depend on the types of functions they 
offer, but chief among them is netting. Netting can offer lower settlement costs, 
improved liquidity and higher levels of automation that help minimise processing 
costs within trading firms.
23 This also depends on the legal framework, eg under 
indirect holding, settlement procedures are obviously compatible to netting. 
  One of the main assets of a clearing house lies in its capacity to adopt 
multilateral netting for positions. Multilateral netting (Figure 4) allows for a 
substantial reduction in the number of settlements and, therefore, in operational 
costs, including settlement fees for clearing members. In securities trading, the 
same security is often sold back and forth between market participants. As a result 
of these transactions, a number of exposures can arise that offset one another 
completely or partially. In addition, ‘netting by novation,’ a service offered by 
CCPs, allows for a reduction in individual contractual obligations, thus affecting 
market participants’ books and balance sheets. To the extent that national 
legislation limits the trading volume of a participant to a certain fraction of its 
balance sheet, netting by novation creates more trading opportunities for the 
participants. Basel II, with its handling of eg operational risk, could be major 
incentive to wider use of CCP clearing. Netting by novation may help to reduce 
the capital required to support participants’ trading activity. 
 
                                                 
22 See also Section 2.2, Risks faced by CCPs and their management. 
23 DTCC (2001).  
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Figure 4.  Multilateral netting 
 






















































































Source: Clearnet.  
 
 
The biggest CCPs provide netting to their members with positions netted by 
securities, settlement date and currency.
24 Central counterparty clearing creates 
benefits for the individual participant and the economy as a whole in terms of 
market liquidity and efficiency. Trading with a CCP stimulates trading and 
improves the functioning of capital markets. For instance, the significant increases 
in trading volumes on the EuroMTS repo market may be attributed at least in part 




2.2  Risks faced by CCPs and their management 
Risk can be legally transferred to the CCP in two ways. Novation replaces the 
original contract between the buyer and seller shortly after the trade with two new 
contracts between the CCP and the buyer and the CCP and the seller. Open offer 
implies that buyer and seller have never have entered into a bilateral contractual 
                                                 
24 Eg LCH.Clearnet provides high netting ratios: 95% efficiency. 
25 The EuroMTS rules give intermediaries the possibility to trade repos on an anonymous basis 
relying on LCH.Clearnet as the CCP or, alternatively, to disclose their identity and, possibility, to 
‘refuse’ a counterparty on the basis of its creditworthiness.  
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relationship. In this situation, the CCP is considered to have stepped in between 
them at the very moment the transaction was executed. 
  All CCPs must have sound risk management since they assume responsibility 
for aggregate and reallocate risk among their participants. If a CCP does not 
perform risk management well, the CCP may increase risk to market participants. 
Without well-developed risk management mechanisms, multilateral netting can 
also entail large risks. Moreover, without sufficient risk management to ensure 
settlement, the default of just one participant with very small transaction values 
can stop the settling process when the CCP’s risk management techniques fail to 
provide a sufficiently robust backup to ensure settlement in stress situations. Thus, 
to realise the advantages of a netting system, the market must have access to an 
institution offering secure multilateral/bilateral net settlement. 
  Traditionally, central counterparties were only found in the derivatives 
markets, where the need for efficient risk reduction is self-evident. Replacement 
cost risks are much larger and more difficult to manage in the derivatives market 
than in the cash market as the risk exposure extends over a longer period of time. 
Most share transactions are currently settled within three days after a deal is 
concluded (T+3). Thus, derivative transactions give rise to longer exposures and 
thereby greater replacement cost risks and require good risk management. The 
repo market falls somewhere in between these derivatives markets and spot 
markets. 
  Potential costs and risks accompany the benefits of a central counterparty. As 
with any risk pooling or insurance scheme, central counterparties are vulnerable to 
adverse selection. Firms with above-average creditworthiness may choose not to 
use the central counterparty, because it reduces their comparative credit 
advantage. In particular, if the central counterparty sets uniform margin 
requirements to protect itself against firms with average credit quality, more 
highly-rated counterparties may decide to trade bilaterally so that they do not have 
to provide margin. Trades through the central counterparty will then be biased 
towards the less creditworthy firms.
26 On the other hand, the most modern CCPs 
offer competing additional services that may attract creditworthy firms. 
  The risks faced by a central counterparty are similar to those faced overall in 
securities clearing and settlement. However, acting as a CCP also has its own 
special features, because the CCP can easily take a role of ‘centrepiece’ in the 
market. 
 
–  Systemic risk; a risk that the inability of one institution to meet its 
obligations when due will cause other institutions to be unable to meet their 
obligations when due. The failure of a large CCP is a potential source of 
                                                 
26 Bank of England (1999a).  
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systemic risk. Systemic risk can be a consequence of the risks mentioned 
below. 
–  Counterparty (credit) risk; a risk that a counterparty will not settle its 
obligations for full value at any time. The whole principal amount could be at 
risk. A CCP redistributes counterparty risk through novation. 
–  Pre-settlement risk; a risk that either counterparty will default before the 
final settlement. This risk is also called replacement cost risk. The default of 
counterparty may leave a CCP in a position that the original transaction has to 
be replaced in prevailing market prices. 
–  Liquidity risk; a risk that a counterparty will not settle an obligation for full 
value when due, but some unspecified time thereafter. A CCP may be 
exposed to liquidity risk, if members do not meet margin calls in a timely 
fashion. If the CCP has insufficient liquidity to meet demands followed by 
delay, it may have to delay making repayments. Thus, liquidity risk is a part 
of settlement risk. Securities borrowing is a way to allow settlement in time. 
The CCP’s rules may have clauses that delay final delivery when there are 
problems with settlement. 
–  Investment risk; a failure of institutions outside the immediate clearing 
membership may also create risks for a CCP. Many CCPs use a network of 
private banks to make fund transfers to and from members and may therefore 
be exposed to settlement bank risk. If margins and other default resources are 
invested in the market by the CCP, they may also face investment risk. 
–  Legal risk; a risk that a party will suffer a loss because laws or regulations do 
not support the rules of the securities settlement system, the performance of 
related settlement arrangements or the property rights and other interests held 
through the settlement system. Legal risk also arises if the application of laws 
and regulations is unclear (ie a specific form of operational risk). Where the 
legal status of CCP’s netting arrangement is not protected by national law, or 
where it clears cross-border trades, it may be exposed to significant legal 
risks. One of the most significant legal risks faced by a CCP-clearing provider 
is the risk that bankruptcy administrators might challenge its right to close out 
positions and liquidate a defaulting participant’s assets. 
–  Operational risk; a risk that deficiencies in information systems or internal 
controls, human errors or management failures will result in unexpected 
losses. A CCP is also vulnerable to operational risks, ie normal business risks. 
–  Technology risk; a CCP is vulnerable to technology risk – at least, if it does 




                                                 
27 Bank of England (2002), CPSS-IOSCO (2001), McPhail (2003).  
23 
It is of vital interest that oversight bodies ensure that central counterparty clearing 
houses as an industry adopt appropriate, effective procedures to tackle the risk of 
default. The supervisor’s role then is to inspect individual CCPs. The CPSS-
IOSCO has recently published risk management recommendations for CCPs.
28 
The CPSS and the IOSCO Technical Committee conclude that international 
standards for CCP risk management are essential because of CCPs’ large and 
growing role in SSSs and the potential for risk management failures by CCPs to 
disrupt markets and payment and securities settlement systems. 
  Safeguards against the default or insolvency of a participant may take three 
forms. First, there are safeguards designed to minimise the probability of failure 
of the market participant. In particular, strict access rules with adequate financial 
and operational requirements for membership of the clearing house fulfil this 
purpose. Second, there are safeguards designated to minimise the loss to the CCP 
if a market participant should fail. This category relates to margin requirements 
that collateralise the current and potential credit exposures stemming from the 
trades of a participant. The margin has to be paid in cash or high-quality bonds by 
the participant. Another possibility for minimising losses is to limit the build-up 
of such exposures by periodically settling positions, especially in the derivatives 
markets, or by making margin calls. In highly volatile markets, sophisticated 
systems calculate, if necessary during the day, additional margin requirements that 
have to be provided immediately. There is a need for stress tests to be flexible 
enough. Third, there are safeguards designed to cover losses that exceed the value 
of a defaulting member’s margin collateral. For this purpose, central counterparty 
clearing houses maintain supplementary resources such as capital, pre-funded 
guarantee funds, asset pools and guarantees. A problem could arise if those 
guarantees are insufficiently liquid. 
  From the perspective of counterparties, the credit risk of the CCP is 
substituted for the credit risk of the other counterparties. As long as the CCP 
effectively manages the risk it assumes, a CCP tends to reduce the risks to 
counterparties and systemic risk in the markets it serves. Conversely, a risk 
management failure by a CCP could impose significant credit losses on its 
counterparties. In the extreme, it might default on its obligations, forcing its 
members to close out and replace their contracts with the CCP. Short of that, a 
CCP might avoid default but only by imposing significant losses on its members 
under the terms of loss-sharing agreements. In either case, because a true CCP 
acts as counterparty to all trades in one or more markets, the losses would be 
widespread. Furthermore, should a CCP default, it would be unable to perform 
services going forward. The loss of a CCP’s services or its imposition of 
significant losses on its members would disrupt the liquidity of the markets it 
serves until its services are replaced or its members rebuild their capital. 
                                                 
28 CPSS–IOSCO (2004). See also Section 3.2, Standardisation.  
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Particularly in the case of loss of a CCP’s services, but also in the case of 
significant losses to its members, market liquidity could remain impaired for an 
extended period. Fortunately, there are softer approaches to deal with liquidity 
risk. Most CCP bylaws have a rule stating that it is possible to postpone the 
settlement date in severe situations. 
  The priority, of course, should be to avoid defaults. Indeed, CCP failures have 
been extremely rare, although the examples of Paris in 1973, Kuala Lumpur in 
1983 and Hong Kong in 1987 demonstrate that they do occur. Two of those crisis 
happened in commodities market (Caisse de Liquidation, Kuala Lumpur 
Commodity Clearing House) and one in a futures market (Hong Kong Futures 
Guarantee Corporation).
29 Liquidity problems from settlement delays are more 
common and can cause serious problems to brokers. A recent example 
demonstrates the role of the CCP in default situation. In summer 2004, a clearing 
member with NOS Clearing ASA failed to post margins and has been closed out 
by NOS. As a guarantor of the clearing market, NOS assured that all clearing 
members received all settlements in due time by covering outstanding cash calls. 
The positions of the defaulting member were closed out by NOS and further 




2.3  Assessing the advantages and disadvantages of using 
CCPs 
Assessing the advantages and disadvantages of using CCPs is a non-trivial task. A 
benefit to one market may be a cost or an irrelevancy for another market. Thus, 
the evaluation process needs to be market specific. This is also a large reason 
consultants have difficulties answering the questions of market participants who 
are deciding whether to build a CCP. 
  Central counterparty clearing can create benefits for individual participants 
and the economy as a whole. However, in many markets, the costs and benefits of 
a CCP may not be equally or proportionally shared among various market 
participants. Large, active participants generally have the most to gain from use of 
a CCP since they deal with the most counterparties and have greater trade 
volumes in each security that can be netted. On the other hand, utilisation of the 
CCP functions can be difficult for small market participants. CCPs are often 
organised so that it is almost impossible for small brokers to become direct 
clearing members of a CCP. This limits the opportunities for small players to 
operate in the market. Of course, this does not have to be the case. With the right 
                                                 
29 See Appendix 1. 
30 For more information, see http://www.nos.no/pdfs/pressrelease2004.3.pdf.  
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structure, a CCP can enable small players to stay in the market and makes it 
possible for issuers of the regional market place to achieve market funding.
31 This 
should be carefully considered when determining the costs of development and 
use of a CCP to ensure an equitable outcome for all market participants and 
encourage broad support and participation.
32 It is also a question of governance.
33  
It is important that market participants and other contact groups of the CCP have a 
possibility to participate to the governance of CCP. 
  Given the above discussion, could any services offered by a CCP be vital for 
an entire financial market? If the answer is yes, there should be concrete 
involvement of public authorities, for example in the form of rules. Here, the 
CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for Central Counterparties are a step in that 
direction. If no, the public authorities should concentrate on ensuring open and 
fair access to the markets. Open and fair access ensures the soundness and 
efficiency of clearing and settlement systems and guarantees a level playing field. 
This supports the view of most relevant authorities, ie that the process of 
EU/global consolidation should be driven by the private sector (market driven) 
and authorities only have a role as a catalyst. 
  Another issue is efficiency. As noted by the Giovannini Group (2001), the 
importance of removal of cost inefficiencies in clearing and settlement is a 
necessary condition for the development of large, efficient financial infrastructure, 
particularly in the European context. Recent research reveals the existence of 
substantial economies of scale related to both depository and settlement activities. 
On average, the centralised US system is found to be the most cost-effective 
settlement system and may act as the cost-savings benchmark.
34 However, 
settlement institutions from Europe and the Asia-Pacific region show highest 
potential in unit cost savings. Similar results were found for relatively smaller 
service providers where a doubling of settlement and depository activities would 
increase cost only by two-thirds. The findings also suggest that the operating costs 
for cross-border settlement appear to be much higher than operating a domestic 
CSD. The evidence further indicates that operating costs tend to decrease 
continuously over time, possibly due to investments in implementing new systems 
or upgrading settlement technology.
35 It can be supposed that similar kind of 
findings prevail also in central counterparty clearing. On the other hand, CCPs 
have been integral part of the post-trading infrastructure in US securities clearing 
                                                 
31 This has been the tendency seen in some of the new EU member states. See also Kowalski et al 
(2003). 
32 G30 (2003). 
33 See Section 3.3, Corporate Governance; ECB (2004). 
34 Only covers cash markets. 
35 Schmiedel, Malkamäki and Tarkka (2002), Schmiedel (2004).  
26 
and settlement. In fact, the Giovannini paper implies a great structural difference 
between Europe and the US as US trades tend to be processed via CCPs. 
  Similar findings are also presented in the London Economics (LE) study 
‘Quantification of the Macro-Economic Impact of Integration of EU Financial 
Markets,’
36 the first substantive piece of empirical research on the impact of 
financial integration on the costs of raising finance in Europe. The work was 
begun in late 2001, and consultants were invited to evaluate any impact of 
integrating EU equity and corporate bond markets on trading costs and the cost of 
capital. The LE study and expert observations suggest it may be worthwhile to 
further investigate the aspects of financing costs. The explicit (clearing and 
settlement) costs rather than implicit trading costs make a considerable difference 
in terms of the costs of finance. Moreover, the fragmentation of the clearing and 
settlement operations has been identified as one of the more costly obstacles to an 
integrated EU market for financial services. When comparing the per-transaction 
income between the EU and the US, it is clear that the inefficiencies in this area 
are mainly related to pan-European transactions. The cost for domestic 
transactions is on average about the same as in the US. A single infrastructure is 
therefore expected to further reduce costs considerably.
37 
  As various studies suggest, greater scale and network externalities are the key 
responses. Initially, they will favour global players. The results clearly support the 
formation of mergers and alliances among smaller settlement institutions. In other 
words, expansions or the pooling of depository and settlement business is also 
likely to enhance savings in unit costs for small and medium-sized institutions. 
While continuous change is costly, it is evident that investments in implementing 
new systems and upgrades of settlement technology arguably improve cost 
effectiveness over the long run. Against this background, it seems relevant (at 
least for smaller players) to consider the question of whether it is preferable to 
build a new CCP, integrate with an existing CCP or set up a new joint CCP. An 
implication that can be derived from CSD side is that expansions are cost 
effective in post-trading activities. This would also implies a preference for multi-
product CCPs. 
  Since the interposition of a CCP makes it easier for market participants to 
manage counterparty credit risk, the number of trading opportunities increases. As 
a result, market liquidity is increased, trading is stimulated, transaction costs 
diminish and the functioning of capital market improves. From the risk 
perspective, however, the effects of a central counterparty are not entirely 
positive. While central counterparty clearing brings about a significant reduction 
in risk for participants, it concentrates risks with the central counterparty. Thus, 
transparent risk management is a crucial requirement for the CCP – and a field 
                                                 
36 London Economics (2002). 
37 European Commission (2003b).  
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where the authorities have an important role to play. In addition, it is typical that a 
single CCP does not accept all shares listed in the certain stock exchange for 
clearing, but only shares from the main list. This discriminates against issuers 
(usually the smaller ones) whose shares are not accepted by a CCP and decreases 
trading in such shares relative to those on the main list. 
  Over recent years, there has been a trend towards increased 
internationalisation of market infrastructure providers. Currently, the two largest 
marketplaces in Europe are Euronext and Deutsche Börse. The London Stock 
Exchange is also counted among these big players. In the following discussion, I 
describe possible differences and similarities in the functionality of the major 
CCPs in Europe, ie Clearnet SA, London Clearing House
38 and Eurex Clearing 
AG. Clearnet SA and London Clearing House began operating as a combined 




LCH.Clearnet SA (new name of Clearnet SA) 
 
LCH.Clearnet SA is a credit institution under French law and supervised by the 
French authorities. LCH.Clearnet SA is a subsidiary of Euronext Paris belonging 
to the Euronext Group with Euroclear holding.
40 
  LCH.Clearnet SA operates as a clearing house for the Euronext markets.
41 It 
provides clearing and CCP services for French, German, Dutch and Portuguese 
government bonds. Italian government debt is handled in conjunction with Cassa 
di Compensazione e Garanzia. LCH.Clearnet SA currently supports the Brokertec, 
MTS France, MTS Italy, EuroMTS, and e-Speed fixed income trading platforms. 
In recent years, Clearnet has rolled out its Clearing 21 (C21) cash clearing system 
to Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam and Lisbon. All French, Belgian, Dutch and 
Portuguese Euronext cash and derivatives trades are now cleared through C21. 
The LCH.Clearnet Group’s CCPs will progressively migrate to common systems 
architecture. 
  Under French legislation, clearing houses must have the status of a credit 
institution and the full ownership rights over the deposits and margin calls of its 
                                                 
38 LCH and Clearnet announced their merger on 25 June 2003. For more on the merger, see 
Section 4, Future prospects – integration perspective. 
39 Based in part on the Final Report by London Economics (2004). See also Appendix 3, 
Description of selected CCPs. 
40 New corporate structure (2004) of Euroclear group (Euroclear plc) consists of CrestCo, 
Euroclear France, Euroclear Netherlands and Euroclear Bank. 
41 Established by merger between the Belgian, Dutch and French exchanges. Portugal joined in 
2002. Since 1 February 2001, LCH.Clearnet SA has been the single preferred clearing house for 
the Euronext markets (cash, derivatives and commodities) with the exception of the 
Euronext.LIFFE which is cleared by LCH.Clearnet Ltd.  
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members, whether in cash or securities. A clearing member can be a general 
clearing member, an individual clearing member or an allied CCP depending on 
capital requirements. The legal basis of CCP service is novation. By novation, 
LCH.Clearnet SA becomes subject to the rights and obligations arising from the 
transaction. At the end of the clearing day, LCH.Clearnet SA assumes net 
payment and delivery obligations through multilateral netting. 
  Credit institutions, investment firms and entities, whose single purpose is to 
provide clearing services for financial instruments and which are within the scope 
of the prudential supervision of the Commission Bancaire can be admitted as 
members. Some additional criteria, like minimum capital requirements also have 
to be fulfilled. 
  The financial guarantee of LCH.Clearnet SA is based above all on a ‘defaulter 
pays’ approach, where margins are the first level of financial resources of 
LCH.Clearnet SA. There are two types of margin requirements: 
 
–  Initial margin deposits, whose aim is to cover the upcoming risk on the open 
positions registered with the clearing house; and 
–  Variation margin or margin calls, which cover the price difference between 
the original price of the registered position and the marked-to-market price. 
 
Valuation of exposures and margin calls is performed at least once daily. 
Additional deposits are required for positions bearing risks that appear to be 
insufficiently covered by existing deposits. Regarding futures and options, 
intraday price variation limits apply. If a limit is breached, an intraday margin call 
is made. In addition, there are additional risk control measures such as individual 
exposure limits, a clearing fund and LCH.Clearnet SA’s own funds. 
 
 
LCH.Clearnet Ltd (new name of London Clearing House) 
 
LCH.Clearnet Ltd is a public limited company supervised by the British 
authorities. Prior to 2004, LCH.Clearnet Ltd was owned by its members, the 
London International Financial Futures and Options (LIFFE), the London Metal 
Exchange (LME) and the International Petroleum Exchange (IPE), and run on a 
non-profit basis. LCH.Clearnet Ltd operates as a clearing house for 
Euronext.LIFFE, IPE and LME. EquityClear offers CCP services for equities 
transaction in London Stock Exchange (LSE) and virt-x exchange.
42 RepoClear 
offers CCP services for repo and cash bond transactions in European government 
bonds and other bonds. SwapClear offers CCP services for interest rate swaps. 
                                                 
42 The new pan-European exchange was formed by Tradepoint and the SWX Swiss Exchange. 
Currently, SWX has 100% ownership of virt-x.  
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EnClear offers CCP services for energy contracts on the US-based 
Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) and the European Energy Derivatives Exchange 
N.V. (Endex). 
  LCH.Clearnet Ltd offers clearing and CCP-services, both directly and through 
third party clearers, are provided for trades in German, Belgian, Dutch, Austrian, 
Portuguese, Finnish, Irish and UK government bonds as well as supranational and 
sovereign Eurobonds and Jumbo Pfandbriefe. US-dollar-denominated Eurobonds 
will be added in the near future. Trades in baskets for German government bonds, 
UK gilts and Euro12 general collateral are supported. LCH currently supports the 
Brokertec, EuroMTS and e-Speed trading platform and Euroclear’s ETCMS. 
  Users of exchanges and markets served by LCH.Clearnet.Ltd must either be 
members of LCH.Clearnet Ltd or have a direct or indirect clearing relationship 
with a member of LCH.Clearnet Ltd. LCH.Clearnet Ltd sets minimum capital 
requirements for clearing members. 
  LCH.Clearnet Ltd guarantees the financial performance of contracts up to and 
including delivery, ensuring that delivery has been made accurately and on time, 
that the relevant documentation is complete and payment is received. Depending 
on the market in question, LCH.Clearnet Ltd either becomes counterparty to each 
trade through novation or through open offer. In the case of open offer, there is 
never any underlying legal bilateral contract between the original trading 
counterparties. 
  LCH.Clearnet Ltd uses three forms of safeguards against the default or 
insolvency of a participant: 
 
–  Safeguards designed to minimise the probability of failure of a market 
participant; financial and operational requirements for membership in the 
clearing house. Members also have to satisfy day-to-day operational 
requirements, including the adequacy of their back-office and banking 
arrangements. 
–  Safeguards designed to minimise the loss it suffers if a participant should 
fail; margin requirements that collateralise the current and potential future 
credit exposures. LCH.Clearnet Ltd calculates initial margin on all open 
positions held by members and collects variation margins. It has the 
possibility to make intraday calls for higher margins as necessary in fast-
moving markets. 
–  Safeguards concerned with who bears any losses that arise; capital, pre-
funded guarantee funds, asset pools, credit lines, and guarantees to cover 
losses that exceed the value of the defaulting member’s margin collateral. 
 
In June 2003, London Clearinghouse and Clearnet SA announced their intention 
to merge. The merger was completed on 22 December 2003.  
30 
  Under the agreement, LCH.Clearnet Ltd and LCH.Clearnet SA became 
subsidiaries of a new financial holding company LCH.Clearnet Group Limited.
43 
As a financial holding company, LCH.Clearnet Group Limited is supervised on a 
consolidated basis by the French Commission Bancaire. As a Recognised 
Clearing House, LCH.Clearnet Ltd is supervised by the UK Financial Services 
Authority. LCH.Clearnet SA is regulated as a credit institution under French law, 
and has branches in Amsterdam and Brussels. 
  The merged parties have indicated their intention to maintain independence 
through the ownership structure and voting caps. For instance, the merger 
agreement provides that 45.1% of LCH.Clearnet Group Limited is owned by 
exchanges and 45.1% by members, with the balance held by Euroclear (9.8%). 
Euronext remains the largest shareholder with a 41.5% stake, although its voting 
rights are limited to 24.9%. 
  Although the two operating companies remain separate for legal and 
regulatory purposes, they are managed as a single entity wherever practical and 
beneficial according to the margining parties. Users are free to hold all their 
positions and clear either through LCH.Clearnet Ltd or LCH.Clearnet SA. 
  Oversight of the Euroclear group and LCH.Clearnet involves cooperation 
with international counterparts. In June 2004, the overseers and regulators of 
LCH.Clearnet reached agreement on a multilateral memorandum of understanding 
supporting the efficient sharing of information and a consistent approach across 
jurisdictions. 
 
                                                 
43 www.lchclearnet.com.  
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Eurex Clearing AG is a wholly owned subsidiary of Eurex Frankfurt AG
45, 
founded in 1998 under German law and supervised by the German authorities. It 
operates as a clearing house for Eurex exchanges in Frankfurt and Zürich. It is the 
central counterparty for bonds traded on Eurex Bonds GmbH (since October 
2000), and for on-exchange trades executed on either Xetra or the floor of the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange in equities subject to collective safe custody, 
denominated in euro and listed on Xetra (since March 2003). Eurex Clearing AG 
plans to introduce a CCP service for Eurex bonds and Eurex repo markets in the 
first quarter of 2005 when new CCP Release 3.0 will be installed.
46 Eurex 
Clearing will extend the trade and delivery management functionalities currently 
provided for equities to cover fixed income markets. The current risk-based 
                                                 
44 www.eurexchange.com. 
45 A subsidiary of Deutsche Börse AG. Deutsche Börse has had 100% ownership of the 
Clearstream group since 2002. 
46 Release 2.0 was installed in summer 2004. It includes changes to the Gross Delivery 
Management (GDM) and Buy-in procedures. The new rules state that at least one buy-in action 
must be executed before cash settlement takes place. This will only be initiated if the surplus 
delivery has a corresponding surplus receipt that is at least 30 days old.  
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margining concept will be extended to the Eurex repo and Eurex bonds markets.
47 
Clearing members can pledge securities or cash to cover their margin 
requirements, similar to the equity CCP. It is not clear why other stock exchanges 
in Germany have not migrated to a central counterparty arrangement or whether 
they intend to do it in the future. 
  The management and processing of pending transactions for CCP-compatible 
securities takes place in the CCP’s Gross Delivery Management (GDM). The 
GDM generates DVP instructions for the net obligation and gross transactions and 
transfers these to the CASCADE, securities settlement system as OTC 
instructions. In addition, Eurex Clearing AG acts as a clearing house for European 
Energy Exchange. Eurex Clearing steps in the transactions, becoming the seller to 
every buyer and buyer to every seller at the moment the trade is executed (open 
offer), and guarantees the fulfilment of all obligations received by the clearing 
house. The amount of margin to be deposited is determined using the risk-based 
method. 
  Eurex Clearing AG uses different forms of safeguards against the default or 
insolvency of a participant, which comprise: 
 
–  Strict access criteria; only clearing members may be parties to contract with 
Eurex Clearing AG. Clearing members must be licensed by national 
supervisory authorities. Since Eurex Clearing AG has introduced the 
possibility of remote clearing, a banking permit is no longer required. 
Minimum equity capital requirements are EUR 12.5 million for direct 
members and EUR 125 million for general members. 
–  Risk-based margining; margining encompasses the entire process of 
measuring, calculating and administrating the collateral that must be put up to 
cover open forward positions. The level of margin required from each 
member is recalculated daily.  
–  Clearing fund; irrespective of the provision of other margin, clearing 
members have to make a contribution to a clearing fund. The contribution has 
to be provided in the form of bank guarantees and/or cash or securities 
collateral. 
 
Eurex Clearing AG and the Chicago-based Clearing Corporation have entered into 
a long-term partnership to create a transatlantic clearing solution for customers of 
Eurex and Eurex US. This first Global Clearing Link merges the liquidity pools of 
                                                 
47 Eurex Clearing AG is the central counterparty for on-exchange trades executed on either Xetra® 
or the floor of FWB® Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) in equities that are 
subject to collective safe custody, denominated in euro and listed on Xetra. In its role as 
clearinghouse, it additionally assures the fulfilment and clearing of trades on the Eurex® 
derivatives exchange, Eurex Bonds® and Eurex Repo®.  
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the most traded financial derivatives contracts in the world and offers extended 
high quality clearing services and risk management around the clock. New trading 
and clearing opportunities should lead to substantial growth in the futures 
industry. Eurex Clearing AG and the Clearing Corp. declared in autumn 2004 they 
will immediately roll out phase one of their global clearing link, which has been 
approved by US regulators. According to Eurex, the first transatlantic derivatives 
processing link will lower the cost of access to the Frankfurt-based Eurex 
exchange from the United States. Hefty savings could be realised by trading firms 
through collateral pooling and margin offsets. Small and mid-size trading firms 
could benefit as low clearing fees bring their costs down to the level of wholesale 
pricing. 
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The current structures of major two CCPs differ from each other. According to 
some market participants, the merger between LCH and Clearnet, though difficult, 
has ultimately been a successful merger. LCH.Clearnet Group Limited operates 
on a for-profit basis. In addition to providing ownership and governance rights for 
users and trading platforms, LCH.Clearnet has undertaken to operate under 
principles of non-discrimination across its customer base. Eurex Clearing AG is a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Eurex Frankfurt AG and operates as a commercial 
entity. 
  As Figures 5 and 6 reveal, the markets where these CCPs operate differ from 
each other. LCH.Clearnet serves a wide variety of markets with variety of 
instruments. Eurex Clearing follows Deutsche Börse’s vertical integration strategy  
34 
and operates as a clearing house for Eurex exchanges in Frankfurt and Zürich with 
a clearing licence for derivative, bonds, repo and equities instruments. 
  The cost structure in different markets also varies. Competition is one of the 
main motivators for decreasing clearing fees and it has been argued that costs 
must come down in the long run. The major European players have all lowered 
their fees over the past year. 
  Although differences exist between the major CCPs, it is evident that all the 
major European CCPs comply with the basics of the current EACH standards of 
risk management
48 and CPSS-IOSCO recommendation (4)
49 for CCPs. In spite of 
good compliance of current standards and recommendations, it should also be 
considered that clearing and settlement infrastructure is evolving. There are new 
requirements from different infrastructures and processes of the newest EU 
member states. The efforts of the ESCB-CESR working group
50 and the G10 
countries (CPSS-IOSCO) in this field highlight the search for answers to these 
new challenges. 
  The above discussion provides only short descriptions of main functions of 
Europe’s major CCPs. It is based on fact-finding analysis of the ECB, work done 
by CPSS-IOSCO and the rules of described CCPs. Figure 7 attempts to construct 
a framework for evaluation of CCPs describing the main aspects to consider in the 
evaluation process. 
 
                                                 
48 EACH, 2001; http://www.fese.be/each/information.htm. 
49 See Appendix 2. 
50 European System of Central Banks (ESCB) – Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR) (2004). See also Section 3.2, Standardisation.  
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3  Oversight, standardisation and corporate 
governance 
3.1  Interests of Central Banks 
Central banks have an interest in ensuring the smooth functioning of securities 
clearing and settlement systems because of the potential impact a major disruption 
may have on two of their key responsibilities: the smooth implementation of 
monetary policy and the smooth functioning of payment systems and overall 
stability. 
  The main reason central banks are interested in function of the CCPs from an 
oversight perspective is that problems with this type of clearing and settlement 
can spread through the financial system and cause serious disturbances and 
liquidity effects. 
  Clearing houses typically undertake activities that support the securities 
settlement process, eg matching and netting of trade orders. Problems on the 
clearing side could, therefore, spill over to the settlement side. Moreover, in the 
case of cross-product clearing and/or cross-currency clearing, there is a risk of 
contagion from one market to another in the event of the failure of a central  
36 
counterparty (or even in the event of doubts over the creditworthiness of the 
central counterparty). 
  Where no central counterparty service is provided, counterparty credit risk is 
managed on a decentralised basis by each participant contracting in the market. 
Therefore, when a central counterparty is used, the systemic implications of an 
inappropriately designed clearing or risk management system, or of a 
management failure, are correspondingly larger than if the clearing house does not 
offer central counterparty services.
51 
  The question of central counterparty clearing gives rise to an important trade 
off. A central counterparty, by definition, concentrates and reallocates risk. As 
such, it has the potential either to reduce or increase the systemic risk in the 
market. It can provide substantial efficiency gains for market participants and lead 
to more liquid capital markets. On the other hand, it can have following negative 
effects on financial stability: 
 
–  Concentration of risk; potential problems can arise as a result of the large 
risk concentration entailed in central counterparty clearing. The repercussions 
of insufficient risk management can be substantial. 
–  Contagion effect; in the case of cross-product and cross-currency clearing, 
risks are concentrated to an even greater extent and may spill over from one 
market to another. 
–  Moral hazard; the concentration can also lead to moral hazard problems if 
the central counterparty is considered ‘too big to fail.’ 
–  Information asymmetry; the market participants may hesitate to trade with 
counterparties on which they have little information. Such information 
asymmetry commonly arises in times of financial crisis when there is a 
general suspicion that counterparties may be close to collapse. The existence 
of a single counterparty reduces the level of information asymmetry only if 
there are no doubts about the solvency and competency of the central 
counterparty clearinghouse itself. If there were fears about the solvency of a 
central counterparty, the entire market may stop trading. 
–  Excessive risk-taking (limited liability); participants may use CCPs to 
externalise risk, ie they may not bear all the cost/losses from trading and may 
trade less prudently, thus increasing the overall level of risk in the market. 
–  Race to the bottom; hard competition between central counterparties (race to 
the bottom) entails the risk that these service providers may try to improve 
competitiveness by applying more lenient risk management standards.
52 Cost 
reduction is generally a high priority in CCP business plans. 
 
                                                 
51 ECB (2002). 
52 ECB (2001).  
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Another interest of central banks appeared after analysis of the infrastructure of 
several new EU members. It was revealed that some CSDs in those countries also 
act as CCP or provide services similar to those provided by CCPs. The key issue 
here is that the functioning of a CSD must not be affected by the potential default 
of a CCP. There are currently discussions on the functions performed by CCPs 
and CSDs as well as on the need to separate them. Given that default of a CCP is 
likely to have adverse effects on securities markets, the effects would likely be 
worse if the CCP and the CSD were the same entity. In the case where the CCP 
and CSD belong to the same corporation, central banks have a tendency to prefer 
balance sheet protection of the two entities. 
  Central counterparty clearing could have adverse effects on financial stability, 
so there is a need for transparent oversight and regulation. At both the 
international and national level, securities regulators and central banks should 
closely co-operate. When a CCP serves markets in multiple jurisdictions, 
regulators should make cooperative arrangements. Currently, the supervisor’s role 




Several international initiatives completed in the past few years have the goal of 
maintaining financial stability by strengthening the financial infrastructure. There 
have been many attempts to standardised functions of CCPs. Below are some of 





The CPSS-IOSCO recommendations were published in the end of 2001. These 19 
recommendations and accompanying explanatory texts identify minimum 
standards that securities settlement systems should meet. The recommendations 
are designed to cover systems for all types of securities (functional approach), for 
securities issued in both industrialised and developing countries, and for domestic 
as well as cross-border trades. 
  Recommendation 4 deals with central counterparties by emphasising that the 
benefits and costs of a CCP should be evaluated. Where such a mechanism is 
introduced, the CCP should rigorously control the risk it assumes. CPSS-IOSCO 
recommendations also list the key questions for assessment of implementation.
53 
For further assessment, CPSS and IOSCO published an ‘Assessment methodology 
for Recommendations for securities settlement systems’ in November 2002. The 
                                                 
53 CPSS-IOSCO (2001). See also Appendix 2.  
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methodology is primarily intended for use in self-assessments by national 
authorities or in peer reviews of such self-assessments. It tries to give more 
accurate picture of the assessment process than the original broad-perspective 
CPSS-IOSCO paper.
54 
  In spring 2004, CPSS-IOSCO finished its specific risk management 
recommendations for CCPs, ‘CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for Central 
Counterparties.’ It was released first in consultative form and followed by the 
final report at the end of November. Such recommendations and standards are 
undoubtedly key elements in the toolbox of public authorities. Due to its broad 
view, however, the ESCB-CESR working group is currently modifying the 





CCPs are rather poorly covered in the original CPSS-IOSCO recommendations. 
As a result, a group of authorities from larger countries have prepared common 
recommendations for CCPs.
55 Since completing its standard setting work in 
autumn 2004,
56 ESCB-CESR continues its work and its aim is to produce an 
assessment methodology for European standards based on the CPSS-IOSCO 
recommendations and prepare European version of CPSS-IOSCO 
recommendations for CCPs. 
  The objective of ESCB-CESR standards is to enhance the safety, soundness 
and efficiency of the securities market infrastructure. Thus, they basically address 
the activities of CCPs and CSDs. In addition, there is a separate, more accurate 
standard to the CCPs. Compared to the original CPSS-IOSCO recommendation, 
the ESCB-CESR standard gives wider and more specific consideration to 
assessing the benefits and costs of establishing CCPs. No changes have been 
introduced with regard to risk management issues mentioned in the CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendations for CCPs. This has been left to the ‘europeansation’ work of 
CPSS-IOSCO recommendations by ESCB-CESR. 
 
 
The Giovannini Group reports 
 
The Giovannini Group, whose role is to advise the European Commission on 
issues relating to EU financial market integration and efficiency in euro-
denominated financial markets, published at the end of 2001 the first of two 
                                                 
54 CPSS-IOSCO (2002). 
55 CPSS-IOSCO (2004). 
56 ESCB-CESR (2004).  
39 
reports dealing with clearing and settlement of cross-border securities transactions 
in the EU. The first report reviewed the current arrangements, highlighting the 
main inefficiencies in terms of national differences in technical 
requirements/market practices, taxation and the legal treatment of securities. It 
sought to identify clearly the sources of these inefficiencies, assess their 
justification and consider the scope for their removal. In its follow-up report 
(published April 2003), the Group attempts to provide actions to remove 15 
barriers identified in the first report in a strict time frame (within three years). The 
Group also identifies the party responsible for that action. In addition, the Group 
examines issues relating to the future infrastructure for providing cross-border 
clearing and settlement services within the EU, including central counterparty 
clearing.
57 Notably, the report does not identify in its structural analysis a 
preferred model for delivering pan-European Union clearing and settlement 





The Group of Thirty recommendations 
 
The new Group of Thirty (G30) report ‘Global Clearing and Settlement – A Plan 
of Action’ contains 20 recommendations for improving global clearing and 
settlement. These largely reflect current practices and priorities, but call for 
increased interoperability, reduced risk and improved governance of post-trade 
processing houses. While CPSS-IOSCO recommendations set forth ‘minimum 
standards’ to be met at the ‘earliest opportunities’ by all settlement and clearing 
houses, the G30 promote the ‘best practices’ most advanced post-trade processing 
firms should achieve within the next five to seven years. The report promotes 
expanding the use of central counterparties in recommendation 6. This 
recommendation endorses CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 4 (central 
counterparties),
59 which promotes the assessment of the benefits and costs of 
CCPs and asserts the need for CCPs to have rigorous risk control. G30 
Recommendation 6 is more emphatic, taking the view that CCPs are strongly 
expected to bring substantial benefits to most markets. The G30 recommendation 
also emphasises the need for harmonised practises and standards and explicitly 
encourages the evaluation of using the services of existing CCP as an alternative 
to building a new system.
60 
 
                                                 
57 The Giovannini Group (2001), (2003). 
58 See also Section 4, Future prospects – Integration perspective. 
59 CPSS-IOSCO (2001), see also Appendix 2. 




CCPs themselves have also developed risk management standards that draw on 
their common experience and expertise. At the beginning of 2001, senior 
executives of the European Association of Central Counterparty Clearing Houses 
(EACH) developed risk management standards for their organisations. 
Subsequently, CCP-12, a group that includes CCPs from Asia and the Americas 
as well as Europe,
61 has been working to revise the EACH standards and broaden 
their acceptance among CCPs. Finding the common position among the market 
participants has proven to be very difficult. The group has currently stopped its 
work and shared their ideas with the CPSS-IOSCO. 
  The scope of the EACH standards is confined to the core risk management 
controls necessary for central counterparty clearing houses. 
 The  standards  cover: 
 
– counterparty  risk, 
–  valuation and margining,  
–  money settlement and custodial arrangements,  
–  financial resources of the clearing house,  
–  default arrangements,  
–  risk management arrangements and resources, 
–  IT arrangements and resources of the clearing house and 




In addition to the above mentioned standardisation, there is a need for technical 
standardisation, eg system interfaces. LCH.Clearnet SA’s clearing model C21 is 
an example of using common technology in Paris, Brussels, Lisbon and 
Amsterdam. Behind the LCH–Clearnet merger, there is an aim to progressively 
migrate to a common systems architecture. OM is also a significant technology 
provider and it is evident that a Nordic-Baltic CCP would use the common OM-
based clearing system. Arguably, IT technology and risk management tools 
embody the core functions of CCPs. 
 
 
                                                 
61 The CCP-12 comprises the following entities: 1) the Australian Stock Exchange, 2) the Brazilian 
Clearing and Depository Corporation, 3) Eurex Clearing, 4) the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 5) 
Clearnet, 6) Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, 7) the London Clearing House, 8) SD 
Indeval, SA de CV, 9) Singapore Exchange Limited, 10) The Canadian Depository for Securities 
Limited, 11) The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, 12) The Options Clearing 
Corporation, and 13) the Tokyo Stock Exchange. See also Appendix 3. 
62 EACH (2001).  
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3.3 Corporate  governance 
Traditionally, a key component of a well functioning corporate governance 
system is the bankruptcy law and related insolvency procedures. Governance 
arrangements among CCPs vary. Traditionally, central counterparties have been 
user-owned, but profit-making limited companies are becoming more comfortable 
with this role. They encourage efficiency with incentives and reward shareholder 
institutions that sponsor innovation and investment for the costs they incur and the 
risks they take. Competitive and profit-making central counterparties may also 
have an incentive to lower their costs, however, by lowering standards for risk 
management or for operational security.
63 According to eg Ruben Lee (2002),
64 
the main function of a CCP from the corporate governance point of view is to 
minimise transaction costs. The contact groups of the CCPs are owners, 
participants, users (eg brokers), managers, CSDs and exchanges. It is important to 
guarantee that the participants in CCP governance include representatives of non-
owner groups. Moreover, CCPs must specifically seek to widen governance to 
cover systems themselves (system governance). 
  There is also the question of agency costs. A principal-agent relationship 
arises as soon as a principal (eg the board of the CCP) uses the services of an 
agent (eg the management of the CCP) to achieve its goals. The objectives of the 
agent may differ from those of the principal, since the agent has its own private 
interests. Under these circumstances, the principal has to bear agency costs in 
terms of lower productivity of the agent and/or costs of controlling the agent. 
Informal power has also a great importance. The ownership structure becomes 
even more important if one takes into account the fact that a central counterparty 
often holds monopoly position in the market. 
  According to the CPSS-IOSCO recommendations, the governance 
arrangements for CSDs and CCPs should be designed to fulfil public interest 
requirements and promote the objectives of owners and users: 
 
–  Public interests; The general public is interested in safety, ie risk prevention. 
–  Owner interests; Owners are interested in the efficiency of the institution. 
–  User interests; Users are consumers buying clearing and settlement services. 




ESCB-CESR standards identify the relevant public policy interest. It requires 
fitness and propriety for managers in line with requirements applicable to 
                                                 
63 Riksbank (2002). 
64 Presentation by Ruben Lee at the Bank of Finland (2002). 
65 CPSS-IOSCO (2001).  
42 
managers of securities firms and credit institutions. The standard allows for 
different board structures. It calls on CSDs and CCPs in a particular market to 
hold consultations or employ other mechanisms to ensure effective user 
representation. In addition, the standard discusses potential conflicts of interest 
between the operator of a system and users, as well as those that can arise within 
the organisation. It requires that these conflicts be identified and managed.
66 
Finally, system access is an important aspect of governance of these systems. 
  EACH has intentionally avoided comment on the debate concerning the 
ownership, governance and pricing policy of clearing facilities in Europe. 
However, EACH considers the relationship between the organisational structure 
of CCPs and their risk management to be critical in systemic risk mitigation. One 
can question, however, the relevance of EACH’s risk control principle
67 (risk 
management arrangements and resources), which emphasises placing a senior, 
independent risk management specialist at all clearing houses, regardless of their 
ownership structure. Moreover, is it necessary to subscribe to the crude 
supposition that a clearing house owned by a profit maximising exchange will 
trade-off risk management standards for greater throughput and income or that a 
clearing house owned by its clearing member participants will be persuaded by 
them to adopt lax risk management standards to lower capital costs? 
  Even if the central counterparty’s risk management procedures are in theory 
sound, their effectiveness is still dependent on the competent implementation of 
those procedures by its management. The concentration of operational risk in a 
central counterparty is considerably greater than that in any individual participant 
in a decentralised market, and the repercussions of incompetent management 
would be correspondingly larger. 
  Corporate governance rules are a crucial ingredient for determining the 
prosperity of capital markets and clearing and settlement infrastructure, including 
CCPs. All forms of ownership have their advantages and disadvantages. From the 
public authority’s point of view, it is important to understand these in order to 
follow up on problems that can arise from the different forms. Full disclosure of 
corporate governance practices helps markets work efficiently. A sound corporate 
governance framework can be achieved by determining an appropriate balance 
between regulatory-based incentives, penalties and market practices, but the 




                                                 
66 ESCB-CESR (2004). 
67 EACH (2001). 
68 For more on corporate governance of CCPs, see the ECB’s latest study (2004).  
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4 Future  prospects 
4.1 Risk  perspective 
CCPs are designed to centralise risk control and management for those trading in 
markets the CCP clears. The systemic importance of existing CCPs has increased 
in recent years as they have expanded the range of markets in which they operate. 
CCPs bring the following substantial benefits to a market: 
 
–  They can reduce unwanted credit risk taken on by counterparties as a 
byproduct of trading. This also facilitates anonymous trading on an exchange 
or trading platform if market participants so desire. 
–  They enable multilateral netting, which reduces the settlement risk on delivery 
date. Multilateral netting of trading positions also increases the trading each 
firm can undertake on a given proportion of its balance sheet, potentially 
increasing liquidity in a market. 
–  A single net movement of collateral to the CCP from each clearing member 
should also reduce the risk of failed trades. The standardised back-office 
processing required by a CCP can also reduce costs for market participants to 
the extent that processes are not already standardised. 
 
There are also counterarguments to the desirability of CCPs.
69 For example, is 
there any advantage to establishing a CCP for cash markets? Moreover, the 
expansion of CCPs creates an ‘all eggs in one basket’ risk, which underlines the 
need for cautious risk management practices. The probability of a CCP failure 
may be very small, but the consequences of a systemic failure are huge. It is 
precisely this systemic risk that motivates central banks to focus on CCP risk 
management, and particularly how procedures are designed to deal with extreme 
events. 
  In recent years, CCPs in Europe have rapidly developed new lines of 
business. To keep pace with these changes, new margining methodologies have 
been introduced. An important goal for CCPs, which clear many different 
markets, will be to develop integrated, transparent modelling techniques that can 
                                                 
69 Recent research (eg Leinonen, 2003) introduces a possible solution based on an international, 
harmonised and simplified institutional structure operating in an open real-time network structure. 
All deals are settled in immediate, T+0, real-time, which means that all assets and funds are 
delivered immediately, thereby removing settlement risk. Under this model, a CCP is unnecessary.  
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provide a sophisticated assessment of the aggregate risks to the CCP.
70 This is 
important from stability aspect, because otherwise it is possible that all market 
players will not realise the extent or nature of the risk they face. 
  The key is risk management. To assume and manage the risk, the CCP can 
choose among a variety of funding options, ranging from margins and reserve 
funds collected from clearing members to additional insurance and the CCP’s own 
capital. These arrangements need to provide the highest level of soundness and 
safety to markets, ensuring that the CCP always has sufficient resources (eg 
liquidity and quantity) to handle major participant failures and eliminate post-
trade uncertainties. Related to funding options, the CCP’s own rules, eg accession 
rules are important tools in risk management. 
  While the current trend of offering clearing of cash market instruments in 
addition to derivatives increases risk for the central counterparty, the efficiency 
gains to (at least the large) market participants can be considerable. As is the case 
in all clearing operations, central counterparty clearing has economies of scale 
that make it more efficient to utilise one and the same system for various markets. 
Large fixed investment costs that arise on margin are reduced in relation to the 
size of the system, thereby reducing average cost. In addition, if a central 
counterparty manages both cash and derivative sides of a market place, it can take 
advantage of participants with offsetting positions on both sides. In this way, 
counterparty can have less capital than would have been required for two separate 
central counterparties.
71 For OTC markets, using of central counterparty can bring 
structural element and greater transparency. 
  At the same time, when risks faced by a central counterparty become more 
complicated, there is a growing need for daily stress tests and other sophisticated 
risk management methods. Stress testing provides insights into several aspects of 
the financial resources the CCP may need. In addition to risk management 
methods, standard-setting work should consider legal risk, because a well-founded 
legal framework supports the CCP’s risk management and operations. Moreover, 
the money settlement and requirements of Settlement Finality Directive are 
central, ie fund transfers to the CCP should be final when effected. 
 
 
                                                 
70 Bank of England (2002). There is little published research that considers the margining of 
portfolios – and even less that considers other default resources. Keppo (1997) offers a general 
model of portfolio margining that takes into account the conditional probability of member 
defaults. 
71 Riksbank (2002).  
45 
4.2 Integration  perspective 
Although there has been progress in financial market integration, the European 
securities clearing and settlement industry remains highly fragmented. Integration 
implies access for all users to the same services on the same conditions, regardless 
of the location of the user or provider. Integration can take two forms. Horizontal 
integration exists when institutions at the same level (trading, clearing, settlement 
or custody) merge or adopt other forms of cooperation. Vertical integration exists 
when institutions merge into ‘silos’ (which comprise trading, clearing, settlement 
and custody in a single entity). Recent examples of consolidation demonstrate that 
vertical integration (which can maximise straight-through processing, STP) does 
not preclude horizontal integration (in order to maximise netting benefits) at a 
later stage. 
  The former HEX Group followed a vertical integration strategy. The first step 
towards horizontal direction was the Swedish-Finnish OM-HEX
72 merger, which 
was confirmed on 4 September 2003. Horizontal integration has been deepened 
with OMX’s decision to sell the Finnish central securities depository APK to the 
corresponding Swedish one, VPC. The sale was confirmed at the end of 
November 2004.
73 
  Consolidation implies a greater concentration among clearing and settlement 
providers and can be achieved through structural changes (eg mergers and 
acquisitions) and strategic measures (eg outsourcing, alliances, joint ventures and 
reorganisations within financial institutions). To date, consolidation has resulted 
in little more than a restructuring of legal entities. However, consolidation of 
technical platforms is on its way. Although full consolidation may prove difficult 
to achieve in the short run, alternatives exist. Other forms of integration in central 
counterparty clearing include cooperation (dialogue, shared standards, collateral 
optimisation arrangements and shared technology investment), joint ventures and 
interoperability. 
  At the European level, the consolidation process in central counterparty is 
indisputable. The London Clearing House (LCH) and Clearnet merger was 
finalised at the end of 2003 and has led to the creation of Europe’s largest group 
of central counterparty clearing houses. These has also been a similar deal last 
year in settlement with the merger of Euroclear and London’s Crest. Although the 
merger has been complicated, unification with LCH as a user-owned company 
and Clearnet controlled by Euronext, for-profit company, has been successful. 
Due to the regulatory and legal complexities, it has been confirmed that the 
merger will not lead to the creation of a single clearing house governed by a 
single legal framework. On the contrary, it has been achieved a common solution 
                                                 
72 The name of OM-HEX AB was changed into OMX AB on 31 August 2004. 
73 See also Bank of Finland (2004).  
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that LCH.Clearnet SA is a credit institution under French law (formerly Clearnet). 
It is the sole clearing house and central counterparty for markets operated by 
Euronext (excluding Euronext.liffe). LCH.Clearnet SA clears trades for 
Powernext as well as repos and bonds. LCH.Clearnet Ltd (formerly LCH) is the 
central counterparty clearing house for the Euronext.liffe, IPE, LME and others 
exchanges (eg Endex, LSE and virt-x).
74 LCH.Clearnet Ltd also offers a broad 
range of services in relation to the OTC interest rate swap, bond and repo markets. 
The LCH-Clearnet merger can serve as a catalyst for further CCP consolidation in 
Europe. 
  Similar to mergers of SSSs, the merger of LCH and Clearnet will probably 
increase the synergies and technical efficiency of cross-border securities clearing 
in Europe. However, the merger will also lead to a higher concentration of credit 
risk in one institution. It is therefore important to closely monitor the risk 
mitigation measures of the two clearing houses to avoid the potentially severe 
disruption of financial markets that a failure of the merged entities could cause. 
  Some recent mergers in the sector will effectively bring about a less 
fragmented structure. However, to be sure that an efficient EU-wide clearing and 
settlement system becomes operational, charging the same for domestic and intra-
EU transactions, regulatory action may be required to complement market 
developments. Currently, EC directives do not set out legislation for CCPs or 
clearing and settlement. They only address overarching principles such as the 
single passport. The Investment Services Directive (ISD) contains the principle 
that an institution regulated in one EU country should be allowed to perform the 
same activities in other EU countries. However, it is far from being clear that 
clearing activities performed by clearing participants are covered by the ISD 
passport. There are very different definitions in different EU countries of what a 
CCP is. It is insufficient to allow an institution recognised as a CCP in one 
country to act in other countries as a CCP in the definition of the respective 
country. This could be the case eg with accession countries. It may even be argued 
that the single passport for investment services firms has had negative effects on 
CCPs. In the past, CCPs only had to accept members subject to domestic 
regulation; now they have to accept members that are subject to foreign regulation 
(home-country supervision). While this is not supposed to be a problem for large 
institutions, it can surely be problematic for smaller firms. 
  The European Commission finished updating the ISD in spring 2004.
75 One 
of the major changes has been to provide the possibility for market participants to 
                                                 
74 virt-x, the pan-European securities exchange launched in May 2003, is the central counterparty 
service resulting from and alliance between the LCH and SegaIntersettle’s (SIS) newly created  
x-clear unit. 
75 Directive of European Parliament and Council of 21 April 2004 on Markets in financial 
instruments (2004/39/EC).  
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designate the settlement venue of their choice. The Commission’s purpose is 
clearly to provide level playing field, but the practical implementation could turn 
out to be difficult. After published its Communication of clearing and settlement 
in spring,
76 the Commission has turned its focus to impact analysis, studying 
possible cost and benefits to widen legislative process in the clearing and 
settlement area. 
  The problem of competition between CCPs and custodians/general clearing 
members in the area of cross-border clearing could also be addressed. Currently, it 
is much cheaper to use a custodian than eg a link between CCPs to clear a cross-
border transaction. A main reason is the unequal regulation of custodians and 
CCPs in the area of capital requirements. The location of the CCP is the relevant 
question, eg in the case of the possible Nordic/Baltic CCP. According the ECB’s 
current policy, CCPs must situate in the euro area, which in the Nordic/Baltic case 
means Finland. 
  Though market participants do not agree on the most efficient market 
structure to be achieved, consolidation among CCPs is an attractive option in 
many circumstances. A single CCP that spans several markets can act as a hub 
among several settlement institutions and depositories. From the viewpoint of 
larger market participants, such a CCP can be a place where post-trade risk 
correlations can be recognised and where, correspondingly, capital requirements 
for risk management can be reduced. This effect can be especially important 
between derivative and cash securities markets. Operations are simplified when 
systems, communications and position management are standardised. This is more 
likely to be the case with a single CCP. The costs for maintaining, enhancing and 
developing CCP technology can be spread across a larger base of activity. 
  The model of a ‘single CCP’ is also one of the examples proposed by 
Giovannini Group in its second report (2003). The group proposed three stylised 
models based on functional approach (Figure 8). The first model assumes a 
limited degree of consolidation, with multiple central counterparties and 
settlement systems remaining in operation (status quo). The second model 
assumes that consolidation results in a single CCP and multiple SSS. The third 
model assumes that scale of economies and network externalities result in 
consolidation to a single CCP and a single SSS. Each of these models has been 
assessed on the basis of cost effectiveness, competition, and systemic risks.
77 
Disappointingly, the report concludes that each has its merits and faults and fails 
to come down in favour of any model. The group argues that these models are 
                                                 
76 European Commission (2004a). 
77 It is assumed here that users and providers of clearing and settlement services operate in an 
integrated, ie barrier-free, environment. See also Giovannini Group (2003), Hirata de Carvalho 
(2004), Bank of Finland (2004).  
48 
only examples of different infrastructures and unsuitable as such for different 
groups of market participants. 
 









Model 1. Model 2. Model 3.
Exchange
CCP = Central Counterparty
SSS =  Securities settlement
system
Sources: Giovannini Group and Bank of Finland.




Against the benefits of a CCP, individual capital market participants must weigh 
the costs of establishing and participating in a CCP. These typically  involve 
capitalisation and finance costs, fees associated with its services and the cost of 
the participants’ systems infrastructures. Where the marketplace is relatively small 
and no established CCP exists, the costs – and the risk – of setting up a CCP as a 
separate entity may be significant and counterproductive. This could be the case 
in several accession countries and emerging market countries. However, where 
issues of national sovereignty, local market practice, autonomy and local control 
militate against a simple invitation to an established CCP to enter a local market, 
the question is whether it would be possible to devise modes of cooperation that 
achieve most of the benefits of extensions without compromising local interests 
and concerns.
78 In particular, there would have to be a fair airing of views as to 
when and where a possible pan-European CCP should be established. 
  The existence of a domestic infrastructure should not prevent the emergence 
of international infrastructures such as the Continuous Linked Settlement Bank 
                                                 
78 DTCC (2000).  
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(CLS)
79 in the field of securities settlement. International infrastructures are 
superimposed on domestic infrastructures and not necessarily designed to replace 
them. From the overseer’s perspective, it is a question of whether there is a danger 




5 Concluding  remarks 
Post-trading, while closely related to trading, exists in a profoundly different 
world. Unlike trading, competition is not the top priority: efficiency and risk 
minimisation necessarily rank higher. Thus, attention needs to be paid to 
preventing infrastructure providers from competing by reducing risk management 
standards or the transparency of risk allocation. Systemic risk avoidance is the 
foremost task of post-trading system, and well-designed standards for systems and 
procedures, accepted by the relevant authorities, are paramount. 
  Clearing and settlement benefit from scale economies that only one or a few 
centralised systems can offer. In general, users benefit from concentration and 
new technology via lower costs and easier connectivity. 
  Central banks have traditionally given less attention to replacement cost risk 
than principal risk in payments and settlement due to the smaller scale of 
exposures involved. Nonetheless, replacement cost risk should not be ignored and 
exposures can swell in times of market stress. For this reason, initiatives to 
shorten settlement cycles are welcome, provided that the necessary measures to 
re-engineer post-trade, pre-settlement processing are also adopted. The use of 
central counterparties can also improve the management of replacement cost risk 
and may help to keep markets functioning in periods of sharp price movements. 
Because they concentrate risk, however, it is vital that central counterparties are 
properly designed and managed.
80 
  With regard to efficiency, the main issue is that existing arrangements are too 
costly and insufficiently smooth and secure relative to domestic arrangements. 
Full harmonisation of rules and the integration of institutions are complex issues 
that involve both the public and private sectors. Post-trading systems are closely 
intertwined with local legal systems and involve issues of national interests. 
  Related to the surrounding post-trading infrastructure, it is evident that there 
are still challenges for consolidation – particularly for CCP consolidation. While 
competition is usually the principal driver for consolidation, real competition 
                                                 
79 CLS Bank eliminates foreign exchange (FX) settlement risk through a simultaneous global 
multi-currency settlement system. See also Kemppainen (2003). 
80 Bank of England (1999b).  
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between central counterparties is difficult in the face of separate jurisdictions, 
pricing differences and national identity questions. Attempts to establish a Pan-
European CCP have failed so far, although the idea has some support. 
  Overall, the benefits of a CCP are becoming increasingly apparent in a 
globalised market with greater cross-border activity. In a cross-border 
environment, through multilateral netting, the CCP reduces the number of settled 
trades to a single transaction between the two settlement systems and the CCP’s 
own account, thus sharply reducing the costs to firms of cross-border settlement. 
This, and the possibility of saving collateral through margin offsets in correlated 
assets, seems to be a decisive argument in favour of CCPs. CCPs can promote 
greater activity in markets through more efficient use of capital and reduced total 
infrastructure costs. This is made possible by more efficient distribution of risk 
through risk sharing, centralised monitoring, greater transparency and netting of 
settlement instructions. 
  CCPs are not a cure-all. Their introduction affects financial stability as a 
potential source of systemic risk. Whereas CCPs – and netting in general – 
mitigate credit risk, consolidation of settlement capabilities necessarily involves 
new concentrations of operational risk. Moreover, establishing a CCP is costly.
81 
  A well-functioning CCP with proper risk management and governance is 
undoubtedly a valuable part of modern post-trading infrastructure, yet it remains 
an open question what is an ideal number of infrastructure that should prevail in 
Europe. Costs are probably among the main catalysts accelerating the pace of 
integration. 
  This paper has set out to give an objective picture of current risks and benefits 
related to CCP services in the integrating markets. Although, the CCP model is 
not currently the top priority in Nordic/Baltic countries, it is more or less the 
standard elsewhere in Europe. Hopefully, this paper provides a basis for risk-
benefit analysis of the Finnish/Nordic-Baltic clearing and settlement infrastructure 




                                                 
81 Giordano (2002). 
82 For more about Nordic/Baltic integration, see eg Steil (1999), Bank of Finland (2004).  
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Central Counterparty Clearing House in Crisis 
Caisse de Liquidation (Paris), 1974 
 
Prices in the Paris White Sugar Market doubled between September and 
November 1974, but were then subject to a correction. This volatility was partly 
caused by the entrance into the market of speculative investors, who may not have 
been fully aware of the risks they were taking. Some clearing members put 
forward orders on behalf of their customers without obtaining prior authorisation. 
Many participants were unable to meet the margin calls to meet this market 
volatility, and the losses of one sugar operator in particular, the Nataf Trading 
House, prompted the Ministry of Commerce to close the market. 
  The clearing house (Caisse de Liquidation) exacerbated the situation in three 
ways: 
 
–  It did not adjust margin requirements, which were set on absolute amounts, to 
respond to the rapid rise in prices, even after being requested to do so by 
market participants in September; 
–  It was aware that one clearing member (Nataf) held a sufficiently large 
proportion of the sugar futures contracts in the market to have an effect on 
market prices, but failed to inform the exchange; and 
–  The allocation of losses was not transparent. 
 
A regulation was applied, so that on the reopening of the market contracts would 
be settled at the average price of the last 20 days (which was considerably higher 
than the price at the suspension of trading). This was followed by considerable 
legal wrangling, which included a decision by a court of appeal to reverse this 
judgement, and the refusal of two of Nataf’s guarantors to cover the sums they 
were deemed to owe. The clearing house, which was liable to settle the 
outstanding contracts, became insolvent when it was clear that its shareholders 
were not indemnified. The sugar market did not reopen until June 1976, under 
new clearing rules. 
 
 
Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing House, 1983 
 
Massive defaults on the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange Palm Oil contracts 
occurred following market concentration, a squeeze on prices and an  
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accumulation of uncovered selling positions by a particular broker. As a result, six 
brokers defaulted on positions of $70 million and trading was suspended. 
  A task force, set up by the Malaysian government, issued a report that laid 
much of the blame for the crisis on management inaction in the clearing house. In 
particular, there was a period of twelve days between the market squeeze and the 
broker default, during which margin was raised but disputed contract registrations 
were not speedily addressed and emergency powers were not invoked. Officials at 
the three-year-old Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing House lacked experience. 
The task force also highlighted the lack of coordination between the exchange, the 
clearing house and the Commodity Trading Council. 
  The task force focused further criticism on brokers who, they felt, should have 
done more to assume their share of the risk monitoring – in particular, showing 
due caution in the acceptance of clients and not trading beyond their abilities. 
Higher minimum capital requirements were suggested as a means of improving 
the quality of brokers and that brokers should leave deposits with the exchange in 
relation to the volume, rather than the risk, of trades. The task force nevertheless 
ultimately recommended that the central counterparty be re-established. 
 
 
Hong Kong Futures Guarantee Corporation, 1987 
 
During the stock market crash of 1987, both the stock and futures exchanges in 
Hong Kong were closed for four days. It was clear that the value of long positions 
in Hang Seng Index futures would fall dramatically when the futures exchange 
reopened. This prompted fears that participants would default on margin calls. 
Indeed, the fear that the scale of losses would exceed the total reserves of the 
guarantee fund prompted the government and private institutions to prepare a 
rescue package for the fund, much of which was required to meet defaulters’ 
positions. 
  The guarantee fund (HKFGC) was separated from the clearing house 
(ICCH(HK) – itself separate from the futures exchange). This meant that there 
was an asymmetry of information and risk: the clearing house was responsible for 
monitoring positions, but was not exposed to losses in the event of default, 
whereas the guarantee fund was exposed to losses but dependent on the clearing 
house for its risk monitoring. This meant not only that the guarantee fund was 
exposed if information was not effectively shared, but that traders, who were not 
exposed to the losses of the guarantee fund, had little incentive either to monitor 
the clearing house’s risk management or to follow prudent trading strategies. In 
practice, there had been failures of risk management. For example, margins on the 
main Hang Seng Index future had not been raised in line with the 2,000 per cent 
growth in contract turnover in the two years after it had been introduced.  
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  Despite the fact that these failures in the management of the clearing house 
actually increased risks in the system during the crash, the report of the committee 
set up to investigate the response of Hong Kong’s financial system to the stock 
market crash of October 1987 recommended that a central counterparty should be 
re-established. The committee recommended that it should act as counterparty to 
every trade. Part of its risk should be backed up by the fund made up of deposits 
from clearing members and part laid off externally (via a guarantee from a 
banking syndicate or insurance). 
  The committee argued that the advantages of having ‘a single body to monitor 
and control the risks in the system on the basis of daily information on the 
position of all the brokers in the market’ and the operational benefits outweighed 
any possible disadvantages associated with the concentration of risk as long as 
effective risk management can be assured. It described the prudent operation of 
central clearing houses as ‘perhaps the single most important objective for market 
authorities and regulators.’ 
 





CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations (2001) 
Recommendation 4: Central Counterparties (CCPs) 
 
The benefits and costs of a CCP should be evaluated. Where such a mechanism is 
introduced, the CCP should rigorously control the risks it assumes. 
 
1.  Has a CCP mechanism (or an indemnification arrangement) been introduced? 
If so, what types of securities and market participants are covered? When does 
the CCP interpose itself between its participants to assume the role of 
guarantor to each trade? 
2.  If no such mechanism has been introduced, have the benefits and costs of 
such a mechanism been evaluated? By whom? Has the assessment been 
documented? What was the conclusion? 
3.  Does the CCP impose financial and operational standards for participation? 
4.  How does the CCP manage its credit risk vis-à-vis participants? Does it 
require participants to collateralise their exposures? How often are 
requirements recomputed and collateral collected? 
5.  What are the financial resources of the CCP? How does the CCP assess the 
adequacy of the size and liquidity of its financial resources? Does it require 
participants to contribute to a clearing or guarantee fund? Does the CCP have 
legally enforceable interests in or claims on the assets in the fund? Does the 
CCP have transparent and enforceable loss allocation rules? 
6.  How does the CCP manage its liquidity risk? Does the CCP have in place 
agreements permitting it to borrow against collateral? 
7.  Has a participant ever defaulted? If so, how did the CCP handle the default? 
In the past year, has the CCP experienced, has the CCP experienced an 
operational failure that resulted in a delay in completing settlement? 
 





Descriptions of some CCPs outside Europe 
Australian Stock Exchange Limited (ASX) 
 
ASX provides integrated trading, clearing and settlement facilities for Australia’s 
equities, warrants and equity options markets. It operates 2 clearing houses, one 
for cash market securities and another for equity derivatives. Both provide central 
counterparty guarantee facilities which are backed by Australia’s National 
Guarantee Fund. ASX is a listed company with its ordinary shares publicly traded 
in Australia. Clearing and settlement is done with the CHESS system. More 
information on ASX is available on the web at www.asx.com. 
 
 
The Brazilian Clearing and Depository Corporation (CBLC) 
 
The Brazilian Clearing and Depository Corporation (CBLC), as the DNS 
clearinghouse for the Brazilian securities markets (equities and debt instruments), 
provides a modern and efficient infrastructure (including multilateral netting) for 
clearing, settlement, depository and risk management for cash, options and 
forward markets. Aligned with international best practices, CBLC acts as central 
counterparty and guarantor of settlements. More information on CBLC is 
available at www.cblc.com.br. 
 
 
The Canadian Depository for Securities Limited (CDS) 
 
The Canadian Depository for Securities Limited (CDS) is Canada’s national 
securities clearing and depository service organization, established in 1970 to 
improve the efficiency of the financial sector through the provision of depository, 
clearing and related services in both domestic and international markets (equity, 
fixed income and money markets). CDS processes in excess of 50 million trades 
annually, holds nearly C$2 trillion on deposit and offers value-added information 
services to the broader securities industry in Canada. More information on CDS 




Chicago Mercantile Exchange Inc. (CME) 
 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange Inc. is an international marketplace that brings 
together buyers and sellers on its trading floors and the GLOBEX®2 around-the-
clock electronic trading system. CME offers futures contracts and options on 
futures primarily in four product areas: interest rates, stock indexes, foreign 
exchange and commodities. On Nov. 13, 2000, CME finalised its transformation 
into a for-profit, shareholder-owned corporation as it became the first U.S. 
financial exchange to demutualise by converting its membership interests into 
shares of common stock that can trade separately from exchange trading 
privileges. The CME Clearing house surpassed one billion cleared trades for 
2004. LCH and Liffe have initiated the world’s first cross-margining programme 
across international borders. This enables CME and LCH to provide substantial 
risk-based cost savings to clearing member firms and their affiliates who have 
positions in CME. CME has had a common clearing link with CBOT since 2003. 
More information is available at www.cme.com. 
 
 
The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) 
 
The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) is the holding company for 
The Depository Trust Company (DTC) and National Securities Clearing 
Corporation (NSCC), which together provide the primary infrastructure for the 
clearance, settlement and custody of the vast majority of all equity, corporate 
debt, municipal bond, Unit Investment Trusts, mutual fund and insurance 
transactions in the United States. In 2000, NSCC processed nearly $105 trillion in 
equity and bond transactions, while DTC, the world's largest securities depository 
and a major clearinghouse for institutional post-trade processing and settlement, 
processed more than 230 million book-entry deliveries valued at more than $116 
trillion. 
  The United States, which is often given as a model for the consolidation of 
central counterparty clearing houses in Europe, still has separate CCPs for 
different products. But there are also plans to foster consolidation across 
products.
83 For more information, see DTCC’s web site at www.dtcc.com. 
 
                                                 
83 The United States has several central counterparty clearing houses in operation, each of which 
focuses on clearing on different products. The National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) is 
the sole clearing house for all equity, corporate debt and municipal bond transactions. Other CCPs 
provide services for various kinds of options and futures. Central counterparty clearing in the 
United States has thus achieved full consolidation at the level of each product type, but there is 
little consolidation in clearing across products. See also ECB (2001).  
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Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing (HKEx) 
 
Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing (HKEx) wholly owns The Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong Limited, Hong Kong Futures Exchange Limited and Hong Kong 
Securities Clearing Company Limited. It provides a comprehensive range of pre- 
and post-trade investment services and market information services to subscribers 




S.D. Indeval, Mexico 
 
Since 1987, S.D. Indeval has been the Mexican Central Securities Depository 
providing custody, administration, clearing, settlement and book entry-transfer 
services for the Mexican financial industry. In a daily average, S.D. Indeval settles 
more than $80 billion in transactions related with capital and debt markets which 
include equity, corporate bonds, debt instruments issued by Mexican Banks and 
Government Securities. 
  In addition, the Mexican Congress has authorised the legal figure of a Central 
Counterparty. In a first step, Indeval is in the process to develop a CCP for the 
Mexican Equity Market. 
 
 
The Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) 
 
The Options Clearing Corporation (OCC), founded in 1973, is the largest clearing 
organization in the world for financial derivative instruments and was the first 
clearing house to receive a ‘AAA’ credit rating from Standard & Poor’s 
Corporation. Operating under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, OCC is jointly owned by The American Stock Exchange, Chicago 
Board Options Exchange, International Securities Exchange, Pacific Exchange 
and Philadelphia Stock Exchange. OCC is headquartered at 440 South LaSalle 




Singapore Exchange Limited (SGX)/ The Central Depository (Pte) Limited 
 
The Central Depository (Pte) Ltd. (CDP), a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Singapore Exchange Limited (SGX), provides integrated clearing, settlement, 
depository and computerised book-entry services for securities traded on  
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Singapore Exchange Securities Trading (SGX-ST). The CDP also has links with 
foreign clearing and depository organisations such as DTCC, Japan Securities 
Clearing Corporation, Clearstream Luxembourg and Shenzhen Securities 
Registration Company to facilitate settlement of cross-border trades. More 
information is available at www.sgx.com.  
 
 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) 
 
The Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), a leading equities and derivatives exchange 
both in Asia and globally, serves as a clearing organisation with the CCP function 
for transactions executed in its market. In 2000, the TSE, as a clearing 
organisation, processed approximately JPY 1,808 trillion for transactions in its 
equities and derivatives market. More information on TSE is available at 
www.tse.or.jp. 
 
Source: Euronext (2002) and relevant web pages.  
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